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Bioethics  
ǮShe canǯt come here!ǯ Ethics and the case of birth centre admission policy 
in the UK 
INTRODUCTION 
The practice of childbirth in the UK, as elsewhere across the world, is (and has 
been for more than fifty years) woven into mainstream biomedicine. As such, 
accepted frameworks for mothersǯ decision-making predominately rely upon 
evaluations derived from fixed and normative principles or standards of 
judgement. The tendency to cling to familiar models of consequentialism, 
whereby confidence in determinable calculations of harms and benefits is 
privileged, means that decisions about birthing tend to be articulated in limited 
ways that can confine maternal autonomy.  
The aim of this paper is to be attentive to the UK maternity policy mantra of 
women-centred care with emphasis on autonomy. This understanding of women-
centred care will be used as an opportunity to ethically scrutinise birth choice in 
relation to place of birth. Using ethnographic data lifted from an investigation 
into the interpretative work midwives do when making sense of risk, this paper 
contests the grounds upon which birth centresi are managed, in particular their 
over-reliance on abstract calculations of risk – far removed from the material, 
lived experience of the pregnant woman wishing to access these birth centre 
services.   
The paper will fall into four distinct sections. A policy context section will 
provide a backdrop for both the discussion raised in this paper and the study 
from which this paper draws. This section will be followed by a description of 
the research. In the third section, a research participant – a midwife called 
Martha (for the purposes of this paper) – will be introduced.  Marthaǯs talk about a motherǯs care will be used to interrogate routine UK birth centre admission 
policy and practice. The paper will conclude with a brief discussion and 
conclusion section. 
                                                        
i A birth centre is a midwifery-run facility where women can give birth with the support of qualified 
midwives. Should complications arise, mothers are advised to transfer to the nearest obstetric unit where 




The inherited biomedical wisdom that hospital birth and safe birth inevitably 
overlap was officially Ǯunsettledǯ back in the early 1990s in the UK. With the 
publication of what has commonly been referred to as the Winterton Report,[1] 
resistance to the assumption that safety for mother and baby is inevitably 
improved through the hospitalisation of childbirth moved from fringe social 
activism to mainstream, governmentally endorsed debate.  In 1992, the House of Commons Maternity Care Select Committee concluded that: Ǯthe policy of 
encouraging all women to give birth in hospital cannot be justified on grounds of 
safetyǯ.[2] Recent epidemiology evidence corroborating this conclusion was 
published in 2010 following the first ever national survey set up to measure 
birth outcome in relation to intended place of birth.[3] Suffice to say, opinion on 
where birth should take place continues to be high on policy, professional and 
research agendas.    
With the publication of the subsequent Changing Childbirth policy document in 
1993, women-centred care became a fundamental principle upon which all 
National Health Service (NHS) maternity services should be delivered.[4] The 
2007 Maternity Matters policy document galvanises the choice priority into a Ǯnational choice guaranteeǯ. Within this national choice guarantee, women have a 
right, among other things, to choose where they give birth to their babies. The 
policy states that:  
 Women and their partners will be able to choose between three different 
 options. These are: a homebirth; birth in a local facility, including a hospital, 
 under the care of a midwife; birth in a hospital supported by a local maternity 
 care team including midwives, anaesthetists and consultant obstetricians.[5]  
The above-mentioned policy documents represent a snapshot of the relevant 
policy publications. However, even in isolation, they provide a flavour of the 
drivers shaping contemporary maternity care, whereby out of hospital birth and 
women-centred care have gained unprecedented prominence. The National 
Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 2007 intrapartum care 
guidelines echo this emphasis on choice of birth by stating that:  
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 Women should be offered the choice of planning birth at home, in a midwife- led 
 unit or in an obstetric unit. Women should be informed:  
o That giving birth is generally very safe for both the woman and her baby.  
o That the available information on planning place of birth is not of good 
quality, but suggests that among women who plan to give birth at home 
or in a midwife-led unit there is a higher likelihood of a normal birth, 
with less intervention. We do not have enough information about the 
possible risks to either the woman or her baby relating to planned place 
of birth.  
o That the obstetric unit provides direct access to obstetricians, 
anaesthetists, neonatologists and other specialist care including epidural 
analgesia.  
o Of locally available services, the likelihood of being transferred into the 
obstetric unit and the time this may take.  
o That if something does go unexpectedly seriously wrong during labour at 
home or in a midwife-led unit, the outcome for the woman and baby 
could be worse than if they were in the obstetric unit with access to 
specialised care.  
o That if she has a pre-existing medical condition or has had a previous 
complicated birth that makes her at higher risk of developing 
complications during her next birth, she should be advised to give birth 
in an obstetric unit.[6] 
 
Having provided this, albeit brief, account of the policy context to which this 
paper speaks, the discussion will now move on to introduce the empirical 
element of this paper: firstly, through an introduction of the research design 
from which the paper draws; and secondly, through the presentation of some 
ethnographic interview data taken from a conversation with a midwifery 
research participant, pseudonym Martha. 
THE STUDY 
The data used to inform this paper comes out of an ethnographic research 
design, whereby Ǯnaturalisedǯ talkii and practice of midwives working in both the 
                                                        
ii The concept of Ǯnaturalisedǯ talk and practice refers to data collected via participant and non-participant 
observation. These data are therefore distinct from interview data in that the conversations and social 
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NHS and the independent sector based in the south of England was observed and 
recorded. The investigation took place between 2008 and 2010, during which 
time the researcher (a practising midwife) worked alongside and talked to 
thirty-three midwives responsible for the delivery of intrapartum care in various 
clinical settings; among these a free standing birth centre (FSBC). The central 
premise of this work was to investigate how midwives made sense of, and talked 
about, risk, and how this meaning making impacted upon how birth could be 
legitimately performed.  
Ethical approval 
Written consent and sequential verbal consent[7] was gained from all those 
involved in the study (service providers and service users), and all transcripts and field notes were Ǯcleanedǯ, with identifying features removed, prior to 
analysis. Ethical approval was sought through both local research and 
development at the NHS hospitals involved, along with national NHS ethical 
clearance (08/H1101/72). Project protocol was reviewed and approved, prior to 
the commencement of data collection, by the Trustsǯ Head of Risk, Assurance and 
Legal Services and Head of Midwifery.   
THE DATA: MARTHA AND JOSEPHINE 
The conversation from which what follows has been taken occurred between the 
researcher and an NHS midwifery participant working in an FSBC: a birthing 
setting run exclusively by NHS midwives which is located some distance away 
from the nearest obstetric-led centreiii. The discussion centres on the care of a 
first-time mother, pseudonym Josephine, who, having investigated her birthing 
options, had requested to have her baby in her local FSBC. Josephine was a well-
educated, healthy mother, who, having read a broad selection of both lay and 
professional literature, favoured the FSBC as her preferred choice of place of 
                                                                                                                                                              
interactions recorded arise out of spontaneous and contextualised social circumstances that may be devoid 
of any active researcher contribution.  
iii A unit staffed by a multi-disciplinary team, which includes midwives, obstetricians, anaesthetists and 
paediatricians. 
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birth.  Despite being healthy, Josephine (along with approximately thirty per cent 
of the general population[8]) was colonised for Group B streptococcus (GBS)iv . 
Risk and the case of GBS 
Being identified as GBS positive, Josephine and her baby fall into the Ǯslipperyǯ category of Ǯnot yet illǯ.[9] That is, Josephineǯs pregnancy could not be thought of 
as being Ǯnormalǯ (or, in the language of maternity care, Ǯlow-riskǯȌ by the 
midwives responsible for her care. As with all disease potential, GBS is talked 
about in terms of risk probabilities. )n Josephineǯs case, the chances of her baby 
becoming symptomatic of disease depended upon many confounding factors. 
These include the age and size of the baby as well as any signs or symptoms of 
disease in the mother, in particular, raised maternal temperature.[10] In Josephineǯs case however, the pregnancy had already reached full term (beyond 
thirty-seven weeksǯ gestationȌ and the baby was considered to be Ǯa good sizeǯ 
(not presenting with any indicators to suggest intra-uterine growth restriction).  
Moreover, Josephine was known to be in good health.  Although it is impossible 
to exclude these confounding conditions to estimate an infection rate probability 
due to the limitations in the epidemiological evidence, the literature suggests 
that a 1:100 risk of disease in a baby born to a mother with GBS within twenty-
four hours of the birth may be assumed.[11] Given the clinical circumstances of 
this particular case however, this risk is likely to be considerably lower. 
Furthermore, such risk probabilities become even more complex when the 
current recommended treatment is also considered with its notoriously 
uncertain success rates.[12] 
An important point to remember in this scenario is that Josephine and her baby 
were both well; even healthy. Josephine (and by association her baby) had a 
condition that might, based upon epidemiological probability calculations, make 
them unwell in the future. Furthermore, the degree of potential sickness can be 
fatal to newborns in some rare cases. In this clinical context, Josephine is thought 
of in terms of a potential future where disease or abnormality could arise; a 
disaster waiting to happen. This gloomy imagined future operates to blur the 
                                                        
iv Streptococcus agalactiae – a gram-positive bacteria that forms part of the normal fauna and flora of the 
mucus membranes found in the gut and genital tract; henceforth GBS. 
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boundary between health and ill health and, importantly for the purposes of this 
discussion, it operates to confine rights to choice. Such blurring produces an 
ambiguous state of being healthy, yet having a potential disease; being at risk. 
As is typical of risk, the management of GBS is suspended within a complex web 
of multiplicity and active meaning making, whereby concurrent discourses 
compete for supremacy. What is important for this paper is to establish that 
Josephine was well versed in the debate. She had made the informed decision to 
refuse the recommended treatment – intra-venous, intrapartum antibiotics – and 
had chosen to have her baby in the local FSBC.   
In the section above, GBS in pregnancy has been introduced in terms of risk 
calculation. As is the case with all such population-based probabilities, how such 
figures impact upon individual care inevitably involves a process of 
translation.[13] Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that this condition is 
understood in terms of determinable calculations of harms and benefits, such 
calculations do not help to allay fears about future uncertainty. Indeed, such 
calculations arguably operate to heighten anxieties about uncertainty by 
drawing attention to the graphic horrors of unwanted futures through a process 
of risk amplification.[14] In the next section of the paper, data will be presented 
to illustrate this process of translation. Taking extracts from a conversation with 
an FSBC midwife, the bioethics around contemporary FSBC practices in relation 
to who is and who is not allowed access, will be scrutinised.  When talking about Josephineǯs birth choices, Martha explained: 
 ǮOriginally, she (Josephine) wanted to come here (the FSBC) and I said: 
 ǲNo. We are not doing that.ǳ You know we have to be clear about where we,  you 
 know, you have to make it clear; you have to make it easy for every member of 
 staff to know where to draw the line. And I am afraid, needing IV antibiotics, 
 she doesnǯt fit the protocol. She is a woman with a risk factor!' 
What Martha is referring to is the admission criteria for the birth centres. A 
combination of concordant drivers lies behind Marthaǯs position on Josephineǯs 
care:   
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 Firstly, a legitimate concern to protect herself and her staff from the 
possibility of the prospect of a risk management investigation following a 
poor outcome is being articulated.    Secondly, Marthaǯs position reflects both national and local standards and 
guidelines. For example, in 2009, the Royal College of Midwives (RCM) 
published standards specifically applicable to the provision of maternity 
care, staffing and environment of midwifery birth centres in England.  In 
these standards it is recommended that all birth centres should have: 
Agreed acceptance criteria that describe those women considered 
suitable for midwifery-led care specific to the setting of birth centre.[15]  
Similarly, NICE 2007 intrapartum care guidelines state that: 
A midwife-led unit (sometimes called a birth centre) was defined as a 
place that offers care to women with a predefined uncomplicated 
pregnancy and where midwives are the lead professionals for intrapartum care… ȋand) 
That if she (a woman) has a pre-existing medical condition or has had a 
previous complicated birth that makes her at higher risk of developing 
complications during her next birth, she should be advised to give birth 
in an obstetric unit.[16] 
What we have is a process of Ǯrisking-outǯ. Women have a choice of where to give 
birth, provided their bodies (measured through a battery of biomedical 
surveillance tests) fit within predetermined risk parameters set through the 
guideline recommendations. Only then are women granted full autonomy over 
their birthing bodies. If, for example, a mother is considered to be too old, too fat, 
too young, too thin or in this case too colonised, then her choices around her 
place of birth are confined. A further extract from Marthaǯs conversation 
provides a sense of how midwives practise this risking-out. 
Martha explained: ǮSo I talked her (Josephine) through the issues and said: ǲYou know the 




Although Martha knows that newborn fatality due to maternal colonisation GBS 
infection of the newborn baby is unlikely (highest estimate approximately 
0.4:100 risk, which is comparable to background perinatal mortality in the UK 
0.4:100 term pregnancies,[17]) this imagined future shapes her practice. The 
severity of the possible undesirable future operates to obscure its likelihood in Marthaǯs talk.  
Martha went on to explain her advice in medical-legal terms. She said: 
'In coming to the birth centre, she (Josephine) is accessing something 
that is not designed for her. The birth centre model of care is designed 
for low risk women, whereas she has a risk factor, so it makes her 
unsuitable and, in the same way that you go to your doctor with a sore 
throat, you, as the patient, cannot demand the treatment that you think 
you, you think you might want... If she stays at home, she is not 
recommended to stay at home, still the same advice, but we canǯt stop 
her staying at home. She is declining our care.' 
According to Martha, Josephine is not welcome because FSBC care is a Ǯtreatmentǯ she has no right to demand. Marthaǯs explanation is framed by a 
bioethical argument, whereby service user autonomy is conceptualised in terms 
of rights established predominately through the medico-judicial system. 
According to UK tort law (precedent set by case law),  doctors are under no legal or ethical obligation to agree to a patientǯs 
request for treatment if they consider the treatment is not in the patientǯs best interests.[18] 
This suggests that Martha is correct in her assessment of the situation: not only 
does Martha successfully appeal to current guidelines and standards, thereby 
passing the Bolam testv, she also demonstrates an awareness of precedent law, 
whereby patients do not have positive rights to demand treatment.  
What is less certain however, is whether this midwifery talk is consistent with a 
woman-centred approach to care. It is at this point that a bioethical perspective 
becomes helpful in that it demands the scrutiny of interests: whose interests are 
being served by this talk: Josephineǯs or Marthaǯs? Using this simple ethical 
question, two Ǯareas of tensionǯ arise out of this data that deserve further 
consideration: 
                                                        
v The test set down through common law precedent to assess appropriate standards of reasonable care 
based upon accepted current expert practice. 
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1. The rather obvious concern of whether FSBC care should be imagined in 
terms of medical treatment.  
2. A perhaps more contentious question leading directly on from this, asking 
if FSBC support during birth is something other than a form of medical 
treatment. If it is instead a way of caring (dare I say nurturing?), then is it 
possible to turn to other areas of care (as opposed to treatment) for 
inspiration for a more woman-centred approach?    
The remainder of this paper will attend to the following two questions in an 
effort to interrogate the ethics behind current midwifery talk and practice 
around birth admission criteria in the UK. 
Question 1: Is it ethically justified to conceptualise FSBC care as a medical 
treatment, clinically suitable for some birthing mothers but not others? To start 
to Ǯunpickǯ this question, a brief look at the nature of midwifery care will follow. 
The RCM suggests that:  
Midwives are expert professionals skilled in supporting and maximising normal birth… The role of the midwife is integral to models of care, 
which promote normality.[19]  
Similarly, according to a recent Cochrane Data Base Review on midwifery care:  
The philosophy of midwife-led care is normality… There is an emphasis 
on the natural ability of women to experience birth with minimum 
intervention.[20]   
The ontological link between midwifery care and medical treatment is Ǯconspicuous in its absenceǯ in these two statements. Indeed, the implication is 
that midwifery care might be seen to operate to confine medical treatment by 
facilitating normal birth and minimising intervention.   
The International Confederation of Midwives, another key stakeholder in 
midwifery care, states that the key concepts that define the unique role of a 
midwife are: 
 respect for human dignity and for women as persons with full human 
rights;  advocacy for women so that their voices are heard; and 
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 a focus on health promotion and disease prevention that views pregnancy 
as a normal life event.[21] 
In other words, the overlap between women-centred care and midwifery care in 
this definition is robust. By contrast, the overlap between midwifery care and 
medical treatment is at best tenuous. By looking at this question of whether 
midwifery care should be conceptualised as a form of medical treatment, the 
tensions underpinning this piece of ethnographic data begin to emerge, exposing 
ethical dimensions of this routine midwifery talk. Furthermore, it moves the 
discussion on to the second question.  
Question 2: If the ontological positioning of FSBC care is such that it should not 
be conceptualised as a form of medical treatment but, rather, is more suitably 
captured by the notion of women-centred care, what other areas of care can be 
used for guiding best practice in FSBC? Following Marthaǯs lead, I would like to 
turn again to a medico-legal framework, proposing that ethical principles 
borrowed from end of life medical care capture an essence of patient-centred 
care that is so painfully absent in Marthaǯs talk. To explore this idea, I want to 
present a hypothetical case: 
Rebecca is a 45-year-old woman diagnosed with cancer. She is offered surgery 
and chemotherapy at her local hospital for her condition. Rebecca chooses to 
refuse this treatment even though this choice could, based upon a statistical 
calculation of probability, prematurely end her life. Her condition deteriorates 
and, despite having refused treatment in a hospital setting, Rebecca now seeks 
out the nursing care provided by a free standing hospice care environment.  
Rebecca understands that this environment is not equipped to offer any of the 
potential lifesaving therapy usually given in her clinical situation. Nevertheless, 
this is still her choice. The possibility of denying Rebecca this care, even though it 
falls out of the clinical recommendations appropriate for the management of her 
condition, is, of course, unthinkable.   Returning to Josephineǯs care, she too has refused the routine care offered for the 
management of her condition, even though this choice could theoretically put her 
unborn baby in danger of illness and even death. This is Josephineǯs right. The 
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1998 decision from the Court of Appeal in S versus St Georgeǯs (ealthcare holds 
that: 
 an unborn child is not a separate person from its mother. Its need for 
 medical assistance does not prevail over her rights. She is entitled not to be 
 forced to submit to an invasion of her body against her will, whether her 
 own life or that of her unborn child depends upon it.[22]  
According to English legal precedent, Josephine has a negative right: the right to 
decline treatment. Furthermore, Josephine, like Rebecca, is aware that, by 
exercising her negative right, she cannot access medical treatment for her 
clinical condition. Nonetheless, the FSBC is still her choice of birthplace.  
Despite the apparent parallels in these two scenarios, there is one conspicuous 
difference: not only is the possibility of denying Josephine midwifery care in a 
FSBC contemplated, it is actively endorsed through policy as well as through 
routine midwifery talk and practice.  
DISCUSSION 
The case on which the above argument rests describes what might be considered 
to be a relatively small risk in probability terms. It is important to note that it is 
not the aim to suggest that there should be a risk probability figure beyond 
which the denial of access to midwifery care within FSBCs in the UK is morally 
justified. Indeed, the bioethical premise presented here stands fast regardless of 
the statistical probability underpinning the perceived risk. Some risks carry a 
higher probability burden than others (although grappling with the evidence 
base that underpin models of consequentialism is never straightforward) but 
these burden calculations are not relevant to the fact that in the UK pregnant 
women have the right to refuse treatment regardless of the probability of an 
untoward outcome. While it would seem reasonable to assume that Josephine 
would have been unlikely to request midwifery care at an FSBC had the 
statistical probability of harm to her baby been significantly greater, the 
bioethical objection to refusing her care should create the same moral and 
professional concerns. 
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By adopting an end of life care analogy for the analysis of midwifery decision-
making (in particular, the decision to refuse entry to, and withdraw midwifery 
intrapartum care within, a midwifery-led unit), it has been possible to highlight 
an ethical ambiguity that has been overlooked in the literature, in FSBC 
guidelines and in midwifery practice in the UK. The data presented in this paper 
shows midwives borrowing heavily from an ethical-legal framework of clinical 
interventions and the absence of the patientǯs positive right to demand such an 
intervention. Moreover, this borrowing is such that other professional concerns 
relating to respect for womenǯs autonomy are usurped. Within this context, 
midwifery practice is not about caring so much as about treating and gaining 
compliance with the prescribed treatment. This is a serious indictment, given the 
concerns raised by the recent Mid Staffordshire NMS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry chaired by Robert Francis. 
The ethical interrogation of current FSBC admissions practices and midwivesǯ 
policing of them presented in this paper makes it possible to imagine an 
inclusive midwifery model of care, whereby woman-centred care can be 
honoured. This interrogation allows for a level of attentiveness to mothersǯ 
autonomy that moves beyond a reliance on abstract principles of risk calculation 
and medical treatment, providing an opportunity to expose the absence of 
fairness, honesty and respect in current FSBC practice. While it is not the 
intention to attempt to Ǯpin downǯ midwifery care to a few definitive best 
practice points, by making use of some facets of bioethics it has been possible to 
confront some of the politically unsettling dimensions of midwifery talk and 
practice in FSBCs that are otherwise routinely accepted and taken for granted.   
CONCLUSION 
The corrective potential of this critique offers an opportunity to reinvigorate 
midwifery commitment to rationality and mutual interconnectedness, relocating 
risk within a professional ontology that aims to encompass rather than 
circumvent the intrinsic uncertainties of birth. Through such reworking (which 
is able to privilege women-centred care), birth need not be seen as something 
Bioethics  
that has to be fixed or controlled but as something that deserves reverence and 
should be preciously defended in every clinical setting.    
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